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SUPREME COURT UPDATE
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY'
Thank you so much. It was an amazing year for the Supreme Court. I've been a
law professor for twenty years now, and I've never seen a Term of the Court that
was filled with so many blockbuster decisions in so many different areas of law.
From the federalism cases that I talked about yesterday to Miranda'sreaffirmation,
from grandparents' rights to abortion rights, from campaign finance to aid to
parochial schools and school prayer, it was all before the Court this Term.
I. TERM TRENDS
With the benefit of two days since the Supreme Court adjourned, I've noticed
some Term themes. I can start with the obvious. The Ninth Circuit got reversed
again, a lot, as did the Fourth Circuit this time.
There were seventy-four decisions this Term by my count.' That continues the
smaller docket size of the Court. If you look, a decade ago the Supreme Court was
averaging over 150 decisions a Term.' There were seventy-five decisions last year;
this year there were seventy-four. 3 It's obvious that the Court is taking fewer cases.
Of this Term's seventy-four cases, again by my count, twenty-one were decided by
five-to-four margins.4 In fourteen of those twenty-one cases, the five in the majority
5
were Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. The four dissenters were
6 This represents the most classic ideological
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
split of the current Court.
I believe the most important generalization we can draw from this Term is that
it teaches us that we must have a much more nuanced account of the Rehnquist
Court. The conventional wisdom about the Rehnquist Court is that, overall, it is a
conservative court; the five-to-four split Ijust mentioned is characteristic. Certainly,
in some areas the Rehnquist Court continues to be very conservative, and activist
conservative. I would point to the federalism cases that I talked about yesterday as
examples. Yet; when you look at other decisions-the reaffirming of Miranda v.
8
Arizona,7 the striking down of the partial-birth abortion ban, the invalidation of
9-some have been very bitterly disappointing to conservatives. So I
school prayer
think when you see cases that in some ways please conservatives and in other ways

* Sydney M. Irmnas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science, University of
Southern California.
1. See also Marcia Coyle, Supreme CourtReview: A Small PotentDocket, NAT'L L.J., Aug 7,2000, at Al.
2. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term TABLE 1, 104 HARV. L REv. 367 (1990).
3. See also StatisticalRecap of Supreme Court's Workload during Last Three Terms, [Sup. Ct. Today] 68
U.S.L.W. (BNA) 3069 (July 20, 1999).
4. Thomas C. Goldstein, Statistics for the Supreme Court's October Term 1999, [Sup. Ct. Today] 69
U.S.L.W. (BNA) 3076, 3077 (July 18, 2000).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
8. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (holding Nebraska's partial birth abortion statute
unconstitutional).
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (holding a student-led, pre-football
9.
game prayer unconstitutional).
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disappoint, it says that the Rehnquist Court isn't going to be looked back at with any
simple labels or descriptions.
Yesterday I talked about the federalism cases from the term. Today I want to talk
about three other areas: (1) criminal law and procedure, (2) due process and equal
protection, and (3) the First Amendment. I'll be honest; I can't even cover all of the
important cases in these areas in the forty-five minutes allotted, let alone cover many
other areas of important decisions. I've tried to select the cases that I regard as the
most significant in the term, especially those cases that might be the most practically
important to you.
II. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Let me start by talking about the criminal procedure and criminal law decisions
of the term. I think one of the truly unique aspects of this term was the very high
percentage of cases that criminal defendants won before the Rehnquist Court. I've
picked three sub-areas, and, of the seven cases that I've listed, the criminal
defendants prevailed in six of them. The only one in which the criminal defendant
lost was the first case I listed under the Fourth Amendment-a very important case
called Illinois v. Wardlow.'°
A. FourthAmendment
The issue in Wardlow was whether flight from a police officer was sufficient to
create reasonable suspicion to justify a stop." The case has simple facts. An
individual was walking down the street in Chicago in what the Court called a highcrime area.' 2 He saw four cars driving in caravan fashion. The record is unclear as
to whether they were marked or unmarked police cars. The individual apparently
thought they were police cars, however, and began running in the opposite direction.
A police car pulled over. An officer chased him down, did a stop and a frisk, and
found a weapon.
The charge was illegal possession of a weapon, and the individual was convicted.
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that this was an illegal stop, that flight from a
3
police officer is not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion.
As you know, I live in Los Angeles. If you're following the news with regard to
the Rampart scandal, 4 and if you live in a city like L.A., you know that if you see
a police officer coming, the best thing you can do is run away. But not according to
the Supreme Court. In a five-to-four decision, the Court ruled that flight from a
police officer in a high-crime area is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion to

10. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
11. See id. at 122-23, 124 n.2.
12. See id. at 121-22. Unless otherwise noted, all facts relating to this case are from Wardlow, 528 U.S. at
121-22.
13. People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d. 484, 486 (1M1.
1998), rev'd, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
14. This statement refers to the recent disclosure of mass corruption within the ranks of the Los Angeles
Police Department Rampart Division. For background information, see Tina Daunt, Council Looks to Preventing
Corruption Rampart. The State Is Asked to Form a Task Force to Study Scandal's Roots and How to Avoid
Repetition, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2000, at BI. "As a result of the Rampart scandal, more than 100 criminal
convictions have been overturned and five LAPD officers have been charged with crimes ranging from planting
weapons to attempted murder." Id
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justify a stop.'65 This decision was one of the five-to-four splits that I discussed in my
introduction.1
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court. 7 He said, in terms of a
Terry stop,'" reasonableness is to be determined from the totality of the
circumstances.' 9 Here, given that the flight was from a police officer in a high-crime
area, the circumstances were enough to create reasonable suspicion.
I think Illinois v. Wardlow raises many questions that some of you, as lawyers,
will have to litigate and others of you, as judges, will have to decide. One question
left unanswered is, Was there reasonable suspicion to justify the frisk? In Terry v.
2
Ohio, the Court ruled that the stop and the frisk have to be independently justified. 0
In a footnote in the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist said the Court had no
to rule on the legitimacy of the frisk because that was not litigated before
occasion
2
it. 1

Furthermore, is it essential that the flight take place in a high-crime area? Or is
flight in any area sufficient? In this case, the Court said that the combination of
flight in a high-crime area together with suspicion was sufficient.' The Court did
not say that it was necessary that the location be a high-crime area. 3 If it is not a
high-crime area, imagine that the flight from the police takes place in an all-white
suburb. Is the Supreme Court going to have a different rule for inner cities as
opposed to suburban areas? Is it likely then that the Court will say that flight under
any circumstances is enough for reasonable suspicion? And what constitutes
"flight"? In this case, the flight is described as running.' What about fast walking?
You go through all the permutations; those are the issues that you will have to
litigate.
The second case that I listed under the Fourth Amendment was, to me, one of the
surprises of the Term. The case is Florida v. J.L.,25 and the issue was, Is an
anonymous tip with just a physical description of the person stating that the person
has a weapon enough to justify reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk?'
Again, this case has simple facts. Miami police got an anonymous tip that an
African American teenage boy wearing a plaid shirt was standing at a bus stop, and
that this teenager was carrying a weapon. Based on the anonymous tip, the police
went to the bus stop where they saw an African American teenage male wearing a

15. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25.
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121.
18. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 30-31 (1968) (holding that an officer may conduct a brief investigative
stop when the officer has reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed).
19. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. 124-25.
20. 392 U.S. at 16-19 (discussing the different requirements for lawful searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment).
21. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 n.2 (stating that certiorari was granted "solely on the question of whether
the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion").
22. See id. at 124-25.
23. See id. The Court stated that the fact that the stop occurred in a high crime area is among the "relevant
contextual considerations in a Terry analysis." Id. at 124.
24. See id at 122.
25. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
26. See id. at 268.
27. See id. Unless otherwise noted, all facts related to this case are from J.., 529 U.S. at 268-69.
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plaid shirt. They did a stop and frisk, and they discovered that he did have a weapon.
Was this enough for reasonable suspicion? The Supreme Court ruled unanimously
that this was not enough to create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. :s
Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Court.29 She distinguished earlier
anonymous-tips cases where there was some basis for corroboration beyond just a
physical description.30 Justice Ginsburg said if a physical description is all that is
required, it's too easy for any person to subject another to a search.3' I could say, for
example, that there is an individual wearing a white shirt with a pen in his pocket
who has a firearm. If that were enough, then that would give the police the basis for
doing a stop and frisk. The Supreme Court said that could not be enough to justify
the police stopping someone and using law enforcement authority for a frisk; there
must be more.32
The government argued that there should be a firearm exception because of the
importance of finding out who has concealed weapons. 3 The Supreme Court
expressly rejected any blanket exception for firearms, 34 as much as it rejected the
idea of a blanket drug exception to the knock and announce rule a few years ago in
a case called Richardsv. Wisconsin.
Justice Ginsburg said that it would be a different situation, perhaps, if the tip was
that the person had a bomb rather than just a firearm. 36 It is interesting to wonder
why the distinction should matter under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Also, she
said it would be different in a restricted environment-say a school or an airport. 3
Consider the following: The police get an anonymous tip that there is a car
driving on the freeway that is weaving, and the driver appears to be intoxicated or
drug impaired. The police then go out. What is enough to justify the police pulling
the car over? Surely if the police see behavior indicative of intoxication, that would
be enough. But do the police have to wait until they see the car weaving? Can the
police just stop the car based on the anonymous tip? Is driving a car more like being
in an airport or a school, bringing it within that exception? Is driving while
intoxicated more analogous to a bomb than it is to a firearm? It seems to me that this
case is going to be litigated all over the country in light of Floridav. J.L.
The final Fourth Amendment case that I have listed is Bond v. United States.38
The facts of this case are really important to understanding the holding. A bus was
driving from California through Texas when it was stopped at a routine immigration

28. Ia at 268.
29. Id.
30. See J.L, 529 U.S. at 270-71 (distinguishing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972), where
a tip came from a known informant, and Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990), where an anonymous tip was
corroborated by police observation).
31. See id. at 272 (saying that "reasonable suspicion ... requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of
illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person").
32. See id. at 274.
33. l d at 272.
34. Id.
35. 520 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1997).
36. See J.L, 529 U.S. at 273-74.
37. Id. at 274.
38. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
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checkpoint in Texas. 39 A border patrol agent got on the bus and checked
identification to make sure that the passengers were lawfully in the United States.
The officer testified that as he went through the bus he reached into the luggage
compartment. If there was soft-sided luggage, he felt it to see if he could detect
contraband or weapons. Sure enough, he said he felt a soft-sided suitcase that to his
trained touch seemed to contain a brick of drugs. He opened it up and found
methamphetamine. The Fifth Circuit said that this was authorized because police
4
officers are allowed to touch luggage.' Plain feel, after all, is permissible. '
The Supreme Court ruled seven to two that this was a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.42 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the
Court.43 The government's argument was that when we travel, we expect that our
luggage will be handled; therefore, we have no reasonable expectation of privacy
or that the police won't handle our suitcases." Chief Justice Rehnquist expressly
rejected this argument. He said we have a reasonable expectation that our luggage
will be handled, but we don't expect the police to manipulate it.45 So according to
the Rehnquist opinion, it is okay for the police to touch the luggage, but it is not
okay for the police to manipulate the luggage.
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Scalia.' Justice
Breyer said, "[T]his decision will lead to a constitutional jurisprudence of
squeezes."47 He noted that travel conditions are increasingly hard, and we expect
that our luggage will be handled.48 There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
modern travel. Justice Breyer also pointed out that this ruling really puts key
emphasis on the police officer's testimony.49 If the police officer says, "I just
touched the luggage, and as soon as I felt it I detected contraband," that's okay. If
the police officer says, "I squeezed or I manipulated the luggage," then that's not
okay.
I should say that this is not an unprecedented decision of the Court. In Minnesota
v. Dickerson, a few years ago, where the police officer did a pat-down search and
found drugs, the Supreme Court said if it's plain feel it's okay, but police cannot
manipulate the lining of somebody's clothes.5" Bond seems to follow from that
holding.

39.
40.
41.
(1968)).
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 335. Unless otherwise noted, all facts related to this case are from Bond, 529 U.S. at 335-36.
See United States v. Bond, 167 F.3d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993) (interpreting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
Bond, 529 U.S. at 335.
Idl
See id. at 337.
See id. at 338-39.
Id. at 339.
Bond, 529 U.S. at 342 (internal quotations omitted).
See id. at 340.
See id. at 339 (noting the officer's statements in detail).
508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993).
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B. Fifth Amendment
I listed two very important Fifth Amendment cases, both in criminal defense. One
case that by now you're all familiar with is Dickerson v. United States,5' in which
the Supreme Court affirmed Mirandav. Arizona.52 Unfortunately, many of the press
accounts of the case don't explain its procedural posture. In 1968, as part of the
Omnibus Crime Control Act, Congress passed a law that said that confessions
should be admissible in federal court as long as they are voluntary, even if Miranda
on
warnings were not properly administered. 53 As the Supreme Court recognized
54
Monday, the clear purpose of this law was to overrule Miranda v. Arizona.
It is notable that since 1968 the Justice Department has continually refused to
invoke this law. 5 None of the subsequent administrations (Nixon, Ford, Reagan,
Bush, Carter, and Clinton) have invoked this statute.5' They have all apparently
believed it to be unconstitutional.5 7
Dickerson is an individual who was arrested for bank robbery.58 After his arrest,
he made a statement to FBI agents. His lawyer made a motion to suppress the
statement on the grounds that Miranda warnings were not properly given. The
federal district court suppressed the confession on that basis. The United States
Government appealed solely on the issue of whether Miranda warnings were
properly applied.
A conservative public interest group filed an amicus brief in the Fourth Circuit,
arguing that because this federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, was still on the books,
the Fourth Circuit, on its own, should apply the law to admit the confession.59 The
Fourth Circuit did exactly that.6° Dickerson then appealed to the Supreme Court.
I have questions as to whether or not this issue was correctly raised and was even
properly before the Supreme Court. The United States government, with its process
of discretion, chose not to raise the statute on appeal. 6' The Fourth Circuit, however,
held that this failure did not prevent the court from considering the question on its
own, "'2 but the Supreme Court did not address that issue. Rather, all nine of the
justices focused on the merits, and, in a seven-to-two decision, they declared it
unconstitutional.' 3

51. 530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
52. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
53. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L No. 90-351, Title 11,§701(a), 82 Stat. 210
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994)).
54. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 436.
55. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
56. See id (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1994)).
57. See id. at 671-72 (citing Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Congress (Sept. 10 1997), asserting
that the provision is unconstitutional).
58. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. Unless otherwise noted, all facts related to this case are from Dickerson, 530
U.S. at 432-33.
59. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 681 n.14.
60. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432 (citing 166 F.3d 667).
61. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 681 (noting that the "United States Department of Justice...prohibit[ed] the U.S.
Attorney's Office from briefing the issue").
62. Id at 682.
63. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court." The Supreme Court,
since 1966, has been ambiguous about the constitutional status of Miranda. Some
cases clearly treat it as a constitutional rule that applies to state governments.6 5 On
the other hand, there are other Supreme Court cases, especially those carving out
exceptions to Miranda,that refer to the warnings as "prophylactic," but not really
Justice Rehnquist, on Monday, expressly used the phrase
constitutional." Chief
"constitutional rule."' 67 He said that Miranda v. Arizona was based on the Fifth
Amendment. 68The purpose of section 3501 was to overrule Mirandav. Arizona, but
it is well established that Congress, by statute, cannot overrule constitutional
decisions.69
The Supreme Court went on to say that it reaffirmed Miranda v. Arizona.70 The
Supreme Court said Miranda is now part of the popular culture of teenagers.7 1Even
preteens can recite the Mirandawarnings, a well-established part of police behavior.
72
Therefore, the Supreme Court emphatically reaffirmed Miranda v. Arizona.
The next Fifth Amendment case I've listed is one that received far less media
attention, but from a practical perspective I think it's very important to those of you
73
who practice criminal law and sit as judges. The case is United States v. Hubbell.
The issue was, If a person produces documents under a grant of immunity, and the
government would not otherwise have known the content of the documents, does the
grant of immunity prevent the content of the documents from being used against the
person?74
Let me make this less abstract by describing the facts. Webster Hubbell-of
course, former Associate Attorney General of the United States-was part of further
investigations by the Whitewater Special Prosecutor. 75 Hubbell was subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury. He was given a subpoena duces tecum that listed
categories of documents that he was to produce, but when he came before the grand
jury he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 76
In Fisher v. United States,7 7 the Supreme Court made it clear that documents
themselves are not testimonial, and people can be forced to produce them.7"
However, if the production would in some way be incriminating-say corroborating
ownership of the documents-then the Fifth Amendment would apply. 79 Hubbell

64. Id.

65. See, e.g., Stansbury v.California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (applying Miranda requirements to state police
officer).
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444
66. See, e.g.,
(1974).
67. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437-38.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

U at 440.
See id. at 437 (citing City of Boere v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1997)).
at 443-44.
See id.
at 443 (stating that Miranda warnings "have become part of our national culture").
See id.
See id.
530 U.S. 27 (2000).
See id. at 30.
See id at 30-31.

Id.
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
Seeid. at409-10.
See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36 n.19.
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concluded that, in this instance, for him to produce the documents would be
incriminating under Fisher; therefore, he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination."0
The government, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002, then granted him immunity."' The
court approved the immunity, and Hubbell produced 13,000 pages of documents
pursuant to the grant. Afterward, the government wanted to use the content of the
documents against Hubbell. The government said the grant of immunity meant only
that it couldn't use the act of production against Hubbell, but it could use the
contents of the documents against him.12 The Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one
decision, rejected this argument.8 3
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court." Justice Rehnquist submitted a
dissenting opinion. 5 Justice Stevens emphasized that the government did not know
the content of the documents before receiving them and could not reasonably
describe what was in the documents.8 6 He said that documents, when they are
produced under a grant of immunity, are protected by that grant, and the government
cannot use the content of the documents.8 7 The indictment was quashed. 8
C. Sentencing Factorversus Element of the Offense
I have listed a third category of criminal law cases. These are ones that I think are
practically important, yet ones that received no media attention. They address the
question, What is a sentencing factor as opposed to an element of the offense? The
significance of this question lies in the fact that a sentencing factor only has to be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence and is decided by the judge,8 9 while an
element of the offense has to be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 9,
In the last couple of years, the Supreme Court has handed down other cases
addressing this issue. 9' There are two cases from this term, however, that offer a
great deal of clarification. One is statutory, interpreting a federal statute. The other
is constitutional. I think both are significant.
The statutory case that I have listed here is Castillo v. United States.' The case
arose out of the Waco incident involving the Branch Davidian religious sect.
Individuals were prosecuted for being involved in a conspiracy to kill federal

80. See id. at 31.
81. Id. at 3 1. Unless otherwise noted, all facts relating to this case are from Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 31-32.
82. See id. at 4044.
83. Id. at 29, 46.
84. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 29.
85. Id. at 49.
86. See id. at 45-46.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 46.
89. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997).
90. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995).
91. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 232 (1999) (holding that a provision of a caijacking statute
that established higher penalties for offenses resulting in serious bodily injury or death set forth additional elements
of the offense, not just sentencing considerations); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998)
(holding that a statutory subsection authorizing a sentence of up to twenty years for an alien who illegally returned
to the United States after having been deported following a felony conviction was a mere penalty provision and not
a separate offense).
92. 530 U.S. 120 (2000).
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agents.93 The federal law at issue in the case deals with crimes of violence. It
prescribes a five-year sentence if a firearm is used in the commission of a violent
crime and a thirty-year sentence if a machine gun is used. 9' The issue was, Is the part
of the statute that provides for a thirty-year sentence for the use of a machine gun
to be regarded as a sentencing factor, in which case the judge must determine it by
a preponderance of the evidence, or is it an element of the offense, in which case it
has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury?95
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Breyer, unanimously found
that it was an element of the offense, not a sentencing factor.96 I want to emphasize
that this decision was a statutory interpretation; it was not a constitutional decision.
Justice Breyer' s opinion stresses the wording of the statute and the way the statute
is structured. Justice Breyer said this is not something that is traditionally
determined by judges as part of the sentencing, which indicates that it is not a
sentencing factor. The Court also emphasized that it would not be difficult to
submit this question to the jury along with the other issues.9 On this basis, the Court
found that the statutory provision for a thirty-year sentence for machine gun use was
an element of the offense." I think the Supreme Court gives guidance in this case
on how to treat many other federal statutes and how to decide whether or not they
should be regarded as sentencing factors or elements of the offense.
The constitutional decision is the other case that I have listed here, Apprendi v.
New Jersey."t o The facts in the case are very important to understand. An individual
fired a gun into a home owned by African Americans.' 0 ' He made a statement, later
recanted, that he did it because he didn't want African Americans living in that
neighborhood.'0 2 Under New Jersey law, the penalty for shooting a gun into
somebody's home when no one is injured would be a sentence of five to ten years.10 3
However, New Jersey, like most states, has a penalty enhancement statute for hate
crimes." 4 Pursuant to the penalty enhancement statute, the defendant was sentenced
to twelve years in prison.'0 5
The issue was, Is the penalty enhancement to be regarded as a sentencing factor,
meaning that is must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and decided by
the judge? Or is it an element of the offense, in which case it has to be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt and must go to the jury? The Supreme Court, in a fiveto-four decision, ruled that the hate crime penalty enhancement is an element of the

93. See id at 122.
94. See id. at 121-122 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(cX1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
95. See id. at 121.

96. ld. at 131.
97. See Castilo, 530 U.S. at126.
98. See id. at 127 (saying "to ask a jury, rather than ajudge, to decide whether a defendant used or carried
a machinegun would rarely complicate a trial or risk unfairness").
99. Id. at 131.
100. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
101. Id. at 469.
102.
103.
104.

See id.
Id. at 470 (construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2XWest 1995)).
Id. (construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e)(West 1995)).

105. Id.
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offense, decided under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard by the jury.'°6 It is not
a sentencing factor.
The decision resulted in a fascinating split of the Court. Justice Stevens wrote the
opinion for the Court, joined by Scalia, Thomas, Souter, and Ginsburg. 0 7 I'm not
sure I can find another case decided by the Supreme Court that had that split. Justice
Stevens said that when the result of the statute's application would be a punishment
greater than the maximum that is provided for the offense-other than because of
prior convictions-it has to be regarded as an element of the offense, proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, and determined by the jury.° In other words, if you are familiar
with this area of law, Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Jones v. United
States"° in 1999 has now become the majority position of the Supreme Court.
Justice Stevens emphasized the importance of jury determination. "1 He stressed
the significance of proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on In re Winship."' He
talked about the difference in punishment resulting from the application of the law
and its harsher penalties." 2 In essence, because the hate crime functions as an
independent offense, it has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and is a question
for the jury.
Justice Breyer wrote a strong dissenting opinion."' He stressed the need for
"procedural compromises" in deciding what is appropriate for judge and jury
respectively to determine." 4 Justice Breyer went through the many kinds of
determinations in sentencing that might lead to greater penalties.' He raised
concerns over how to allocate the judge/jury function in light of the majority opinion
that treats penalties greater than the maximum as a separate offense, requiring
determination by the jury under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.l 6
I think this case raises many important questions which are sure to be litigated,
and very quickly. For example, does this case articulate a new rule of constitutional
law? If so, is it one that can be applied retroactively?
As you know from your practice in this area, under Teague v. Lane, the threshold
question for habeas corpus is, Is it a new rule? "' If it is, it's not going to be heard
on habeas unless it's one that can be applied retroactively.
Is this a new rule? Judge Lucero"' asked me this question yesterday, so I went
back and read the opinion very carefully. I can't find an answer. There is language

106. Id. at 490.
107. Id. at 468.
108. See id at 490.
109. 526 U.S. 227,252-53 (1999) (arguing that "it is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury
the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed").
110. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77.
111. See id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
112. See id at 477-80.

113. Id.at555.
114.

Id.

115. See id. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 555-65.
116. See id.
117. 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989).
118. The speaker is referring to Carlos Lucero, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
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in Justice Stevens's majority opinion that says the results here are "foreshadowed
by" our prior ruling, and he cites the Court's opinion in Jones." 9
What about retroactive application? More generally, if this case is retroactively
applied, every one of you as a judge is going to be flooded with petitions from
prisoners, federal and state, saying, "We were sentenced in a way that didn't take
into account that this was an increase that is regarded as an element."
Where do we draw the line? When do we regard the increase in sentence as a
separate offense, and when do we regard it as merely a sentencing factor? The Court
does not articulate a clear standard here, other than the statement, as the holding,
that if there is a penalty greater than the maximum-other than for a prior
conviction-it is regarded as a separate offense." 2 This is an enormously important
decision.
I. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Let me.shift to the second area that I want to talk about, which concerns due
process and equal protection. There are two due process cases and one equal
protection case.
A. Due Process
The first case that I have listed is Troxel v. Granville.' The press refers to it as
a "grandparents' rights" case. 22 The case had tragic facts. A father with two young
daughters committed suicide. " For the first year after his death, the mother allowed
the girls to regularly visit the paternal grandparents. Then she decided that she was
going to largely cut off the visitation between the girls and the grandparents. She did
not completely end it, but greatly restricted it. The grandparents then sued under a
Washington law that allows any person to petition for visitation and the court to
grant visitation if it "may serve the best interests of the child."'"
The trial court granted the grandparents much more extensive visitation,"2 but the
Washington Supreme Court declared the Washington law unconstitutional."2 The
Washington Supreme Court said that parents have a fundamental right to control the
in this case, over
upbringing of their children and to expand grandparent visitation
27
the mother's objection, was to violate the mother's rights.

119. Apprendi. 530 U.S. at 476 (citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
at 490.
120. See id.
121. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
122. See, e.g., Shirley M. Sogah, Court Ruling On Grandparents' Rights Not Wrong, DENVER PoST,June 8,
2000, at B9.
123. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at6O. Unless otherwise noted, all facts related to this case are from Troxel, 530 U.S.
at 60-61.
124. Id. at 61 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)).
125. See id (noting that the Washington court issued an oral ruling).
126. In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30-31 (Wash. 1998). affid sub nor., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57 (2000).
127. See id
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The Supreme Court, without a majority opinion, struck down the Washington
law." Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion for four justices.'29 "The
Washington non-parental visitation statute is breathtakingly broad," ' 30 she wrote,
noting that the law allowed any person, at any time, to petition for visitation. She
said that the Washington law defined the best interests of the child but didn't require
that any deference be given to the parents' choices.' 3 ' The Supreme Court said that
in light of the parents' right to control the fundamental upbringing of their children,
the Washington law was unconstitutional.' 32
Justice Thomas wrote a fascinating opinion concurring in the judgment, pointing
out that no one was asking the Court to reconsider whether or not there should be
a fundamental right for parents to control the upbringing of their children under
substantive due process.'1 It's clear from Justice Thomas's prior opinions that he
doesn't believe in substantive due process or fundamental rights, so long as no one
is asking the Court to consider them. He concluded that because this was a
fundamental right, the Court would have to use strict scrutiny, and under strict
scrutiny, this law should be found to violate the parents' right to control the
upbringing of their children."
It was a six-to-three decision invalidating the Washington law without a majority
opinion. 35 I think it is possible to read this case very narrowly or much more
broadly. The narrow reading says that the Washington-type visitation statute violates
the Constitution, but not the grandparent visitation statutes inother states. Every one
of the states has a grandparent visitation statute. 31 Ifyou read the decision narrowly,
the Court was just invalidating the type of statute that lets a person petition at any
time for visitation under a best-interests-of-the-child standard without requiring
consideration of the parents' interests. Under a broader reading, the case protects the
fundamental right of parents to control the upbringing of their children. Absent
evidence of parental abuse or neglect, or some other concrete finding against the
parents, it would violate the parents' rights to mandate visitation of which the
parents disapprove. Further litigation will have to clarify this decision.
The other due process case that I listed is Stenberg v. Carhart,' the so-called
partial birth abortion case from Wednesday. Nebraska, like thirty-one other states,
prohibited a procedure that is called partial birth abortion.' 3 8 The way the statute is
written, it prohibits the intentional removal of a fetus from the womb for the purpose
of ending the fetus's life.'39

128. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at75 (plurality opinion).
129. Id.at60.
130. Id.at67.
131.

See id.

132. See id at75.
133. See Troxel,580 U.S. at 80.
134. See id
135. Id at 59.
136. Id at73 n.*.
137. 530 U.S. 914, 120 S. Ct.2597 (2000).
138. l at 921-22 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-328(1) (Supp. 1999)).
139. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326(9) (Supp. 1999) (reading in part, "delivering.. .a living unborn child,...
for
the purpose of performing a procedure that the person performing such procedure knows will kill the unborn child").
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I think in order to understand this decision you have to know that the district
court made extensive findings of fact as to the effects of this law. The district court
found that the law would prohibit a procedure called dilation and evacuation, which
is often used for pre-viability abortion procedures.'" It would also, according to the
district court, prohibit the dilation and extraction procedure that is used for abortions
in the weeks right before viability. 4' The district court found, as a matter of fact,
of pregnancy. 42
that these are often the safest procedures for abortion at those stages
In light of this fact, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, held the
Nebraska law unconstitutional.' 4 3 Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the Court,
joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and O'Connor."' Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas,
and Kennedy dissented. 45
Justice Breyer began his opinion by saying that the standard in evaluating
government regulation of abortion before viability is whether the government law
places an undue burden on the right to abortion."
I want to pause here because that is significant in itself. In Planned Parenthood
ofSoutheastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey, 47 in 1992, three justices (O'Connor, Souter,
and Kennedy) in a joint opinion said that the undue burden test should be used in
4
evaluating governmental regulation of pre-viability abortion.' But that was not a
majority opinion. In Stenberg, for the first time, five justices in a majority opinion
49
have adopted the undue burden test and applied it to the Nebraska law.'
The Court points out that what was involved in this case was the regulation of
pre-viability abortions."S The Court emphasized that women have the right to previability abortions and that the woman's safety is paramount.'' Justice Breyer's
opinion, which quotes extensively from the fact finding by the federal district court,
states that, though it wasn't its intended consequence, the law could prohibit not
only the dilation and evacuation procedure, but also the dilation and extraction
procedure.' In light of the district court's holding that the dilation and extraction
procedure is often the safest form of abortion, the Supreme Court found3 that the law
placed an undue burden on a woman's right to pre-viability abortion.

140. Carhartv. Stenberg, II F.Supp.2d 1099, 1127 (D. Neb. 1998), aofd, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S. Ct. 2597
(2000).
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1122-23.
Id. at 1132.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922.

144. Id.at 920.
145.

Id.

146. Id.
147.

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

148. See id. at 876 (plurality opinion).
149.
150.
151.

See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 920.
Id.
Id.

152. See id. at 939.
153.

See id. at 945-46.
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Justice Thomas wrote an angry dissent accusing the Supreme Court of
legitimizing infanticide." Justice Kennedy wrote that under the undue burden test,
the Nebraska law should be upheld.'55
Justice Scalia's fascinating dissenting opinion noted that because dissents are
published in order of seniority, his would come before the others. But, he said,
"[T]he reader will not comprehend what follows unless he reads [the other dissents]
first.' 5 6 He intimated that he did not want any of the other dissenters to be
misunderstood." They argued that this case represented an improper application of
the undue burden test. 58 Justice Scalia voiced his belief that Stenberg is the natural
59
consequence of the undue burden test, showing the undue burden test is wrong.
B. Equal Protection
The other case I've listed in this category is an equal protection case. From a
practical perspective, it is among the most important cases I'll talk about this
morning. But my guess is that unless you read the Supreme Court Reporter Law
Week very carefully, it's a case that probably missed your attention. It got no writeup in the New York Times or the Washington Post or any local newspaper. The case
is Village of Willowbrook v. OlechIW and the issue was, If a person claims to be
discriminated against in a class of one, is there a claim under the Equal Protection
161

Clause?

Here are the facts: A person owns a home in a suburb of Chicago, the Village of
Willowbrook.' 6 ' That person applies for an easement to be connected to the city's
water and sewer system. The village says, in essence, "We want a thirty-foot
easement on your property to connect you." The person says, "You gave everybody
else water and sewer connections with a fifteen-foot easement. You're
discriminating against me by requiring a thirty-foot easement. Moreover, you are
doing this because I successfully sued you earlier, and now you're retaliating." The
lawsuit actually named three homeowners as plaintiffs, five individuals in all. 3
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, said that there was discrimination,
even though the claim was of discrimination against a class of one.'" In a footnote,
the Court said it recognized that there were five plaintiffs, three homeowners in all,
but that it didn't matter; even if it's just one person, it's a claim. 65 The Court said
equal protection safeguards individuals, not just groups; therefore, even if a single
person claims they are discriminated against, it's sufficient.'66 So long as the person
154. See id. at 983 (stating that this procedure "so closely borders on infanticide that 30 States have attempted

to ban it").
155. Id. at 957.
156. Id. at 953.
157. See id.
158. See id.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 953-56.
528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
Id. at564.
Id Unless otherwise noted, all facts related to the case are from Olech, 528 U.S. at 563-64.
Id. at 564 a.*.
Id. at 564-65.
Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 n. *
See id.
at 564.
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claims they were subjected to arbitrary, unjustified treatment, that's enough to state
a claim under equal protection. 6
The per curiam opinion then said that the Court had no need to consider whether
retaliation would also be sufficient in itself, because in this case the claim of
arbitrary treatment and discrimination was enough."6 Justice Breyer, however, wrote
here only
a concurring opinion saying that he would go along with the Court
69
motive.
improper
and
because there were allegations of retaliation
The reason I think the case is so important is that it opens the door to equal
protection constitutional challenges to many things that previously have not been
dealt with as constitutional rights. Think of the zoning variance that is turned down.
Now the disgruntled applicant can say, "I'm discriminated against." Or the person
applies for a conditional use permit that is turned down. Different than others? Bring
it as an equal protection claim. This was the argument made by the government to
the Supreme Court. 2°
Justice Breyer seemed troubled by that argument, but in this case there were
allegations of retaliation.' Notice that the majority of the Court said allegations of
retaliation are not necessary; the claims of arbitrary treatment and unjustified
discrimination are sufficient."t The case is extremely important.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT
The third and final area that I want to talk about concerns the First Amendment.
There were ten First Amendment cases this Term.' That's ten out of seventy-four,
which is really a very significant part of the docket.
A. Speech
Let me talk first about the speech cases and then about the religion cases. There
were eight speech cases this Term' 74-five that I want to briefly talk about. The first,
17
case. A
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 1 was a campaign finance
76
Missouri statute limited contributions to candidates for public office. The limit for

167. See id.
168. See id. at565.
169. See id. at 566.
170. See Olech, 528 U.S. at 565 (Breyer, J., concurring).
171. See id. at566.
172. See id. at565.
173. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Cal. Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis.
Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S.
32 (1999).
174. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703
(2000); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000);
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth. 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting
Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
175. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
176. Id. at 382 (construing Mo. REv. STAT. § 130.032 (1994)).
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a relatively local office, like the state assembly, was a $275 contribution.'" The limit
for a statewide office-governor, attorney general, etc.-was $1,075.17' The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declared the Missouri statute
unconstitutional, saying that limiting contributions for political speech has to meet
strict scrutiny, and the overnment hadn't proven sufficient corruption in Missouri
to meet that standard.' The Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision, reversed the
Eighth Circuit and upheld the law." °
Justice Souter wrote the opinion for the Court.' His opinion relied heavily on
Buckley v. Valeo.' 2 In Buckley, the Supreme Court said that the government can
impose contribution limits because contributions risk corruption or the appearance
of corruption, but expenditure limits are unconstitutional." 3 The Supreme Court
reaffirmed that distinction.' 8 The Supreme Court said a specific level of corruption
doesn't have to be proven in order to justify the law. 5 The Court is not going to get
into the business of calibrating, in light of inflation, what dollar limits are reasonable
and what aren't.'s6 The Court reiterated that contribution limits to combat corruption
and the appearance
of corruption are constitutional, while spending limits are
87
unconstitutional.
I think this case is significant because the Court did not change the law. I also
think it is ironic that the case is entitled Nixon. Practically, there are many lawsuits
pending around the country challenging contribution limits that this ruling will
affect. I think these pending cases are all likely to be upheld, except when they
challenge small limits. The argument remains that the small size of the contribution
unduly interferes with the political process.
The second case that I have listed is another surprise. Board of Regents of
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth'" involved the constitutionality of
mandatory student activities fees. Students at every college and university pay a fee
each year that subsidizes on-campus activities. A group of conservative law students
at the University of Wisconsin Law School challenged the mandatory student
activities fee, saying, in essence, "We're being forced to subsidize things we don't
believe in and that violates our First Amendment rights."' 89 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the mandatory student activities fee
unconstitutional.'" The Seventh Circuit analogized this case to union dues and bar

177. Id. at 383.
178. I
179. See Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 520, 521-22 (8th Cit. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
180. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 398
181. Id.
at 398.
182. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
183. Id. at4-5.
184. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 385.
185. See idat 391-92.
186. See id. at 396-97 (stating that "cases cannot be truncated to a narrow question about the power of the
dollar").
187. See id. at 387-88.
188. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
189. Seeid. at221.
190. Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F. 3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nora., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
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dues cases, saying it forces people to contribute money to things they don't believe
in and violates the First Amendment.' 9'
I predicted that this would be a closely divided Court, maybe without a majority
opinion. That shows why you wouldn't want me to be your handicapper.92 The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the circuit and upheld Wisconsin law.'
93
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court. He said that mandatory
student activities fees are permissible so long as the funds are distributed in a
viewpoint-neutral fashion."9 Justice Kennedy said that in this case the plaintiffs had
95
stipulated that the money was distributed in a viewpoint neutral fashion.
Apparently the plaintiffs did that as a strategic choice, because they wanted all
mandatory fees invalidated. They didn't want to argue about which ones were
viewpoint neutral.
You know what the next generation of litigation-minded students will say, "This
isn't viewpoint neutral." It is hard to see how disbursement can be. Does a university
have to give as much money to a Nazi group as it does to another group with the
same number of students? Distributing money where content-based choices are
made was not the issue here. The Court in this case just said that mandatory student
activities fees were not unconstitutional.19
97
The third case I've listed is City of Erie v. Pap'sA.M.' This case will be very
important for those of you who practice local government law and certainly for
those of you who sit in trial courts. Erie involved the constitutionality of a city
9
ordinance that proscribed public nudity.' The ordinance had been adopted to close
99
down a nude-dancing establishment.
In 1991, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,m the Supreme Court upheld the
2
application of Indiana's public nudity law to close down the Kitty Cat Lounge. 0'
Many thought that the Court got to the bare facts-the naked truth-but there was
no majority opinion for the Supreme Court in that case.
The Erie council adopted the nudity law with the goal of shutting down the
Kandyland nude-dancing establishment. 20 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said,
reading Barnes (not a majority opinion), that the Erie ordinance was
unconstitutional. 230 While the case was pending, Kandyland closed down,' so the
Supreme Court seemed likely to dismiss the case as moot. Maybe the justices
wanted to see the pictures and then dismiss the case as moot. However, the Supreme

191.

Id. at 731 (analogizing to Lehnert v. Fenis Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) and Keller v. State Bar

of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990)).
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Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice O'Connor, said that since the
company still had the license for the business, it might reopen the club. 5 That
meant the case was not moot. The Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision without
a majority opinion, upheld the City of Erie's public nudity law.'
Justice O'Connor wrote for a plurality of the Court. °7 She said that nude dancing
is not speech, but it is conduct thatt communicates, and conduct that communicates
is essentially subjected to heightened scrutiny.2w The government here had an
important interest in preventing the undesirable secondary effect that comes from
nude dancing--crime, prostitution, and the like that occurs outside the nude-dancing
establishments.
The problem with this argument was, as Justice Souter pointed out in the dissent,
that there is nothing in the record to document that the nude-dancing club caused
these offenses. 20 9 Justice O'Connor addressed that argument, saying there didn't
have to be.2"' She said the local legislators could draw from their personal
experience, observing what went on outside, not inside.2
Justice Stevens, however, made what I think is a very important point when he
said that the law allows dancers with pasties and G-strings, but it does not allow
complete nudity.21 2 There is no evidence to show that dancers with pasties and Gstrings cause less crime than completely nude dancers, and isn't that really what has
to be proven?2" 3 i think the greatest thing we see in the case is the Court's
willingness to uphold the law, even without any proof.
Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment.2t 4 They said that the First
Amendment can't be used to challenge neutral laws of general application.2 They
tried to take the standards that the Court has adopted-the free-access laws-and
apply them to speech.21 6
The fourth case that I've listed here is Hill v. Colorado.2t 7 It involved a Colorado
law that prohibits going within eight feet of a person for purposes of leafleting,
holding up a protest sign, education, or counseling within 100 feet of a reproductive
health care facility. 28 The obvious purpose of the law was to stop the so-called
"sidewalk counselors" outside abortion clinics.
The Supreme Court on Wednesday, in a six-to-three decision, upheld the
Colorado law as constitutional.2 9 The Supreme Court invoked traditional First
Amendment principles with regard to legislating speech on public sidewalks and in
205.
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public places. The Court said that the Colorado law is content, subject matter, and
viewpoint neutral. 22' It prevents going up to a person-whether you express pro- or
anti-abortion messages, or any other subject matter-if it is for protest, education,
counseling, leafleting, or holding up signs.22 The Court said that the government
2
can regulate speech in public forums if it is content neutral. If the government has
a time, place, and manner restriction that serves an important government interest,
2 3
and there is an alternative place for speech, then it is really a place restriction. The
Court said that the restrictions on going within eight feet of a person within a
hundred feet of a clinic are important in order to protect entrance to and exit from
the facility.? 4 The Court said that restrictions have to be narrowly tailored, and,
23
because the Colorado law's restrictions are narrowly tailored, it is constitutional.
The final speech case that I've listed, also from Wednesday, is Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale.2 New Jersey, like almost every state, has a law prohibiting
discrimination by business establishments and places of public accommodation
based on race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation.' James Dale was a life-long
Boy Scout from the age of eight who became an assistant scout leader as a young
adult. 22 8 While a student at Rutgers University, he gave a speech advocating gay
rights in which he declared that he was gay. Officials of the Boy Scouts saw press
coverage of the speech and sent Dale a letter saying that since he had identified
himself as gay, he was no longer allowed to be an assistant scout leader. He sued
under New Jersey's public accommodation statute.
The Boy Scouts defended on their First Amendment rights and freedom of
association. 29 The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in favor of Dale and against the
Boy Scouts. 3 ° On Wednesday, in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court ruled
3
in favor of the Boy Scouts and reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. 21 2 The key precedent here that both the majority and
23 3
the dissent argued about was a case called Roberts v. United States Jaycees. It
2
34
involved the Minnesota Human Rights Act, and whether that act could be applied
to stop the Jaycees from discriminating based on gender.235 In that case, the Supreme
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Court said that the government had a "compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against its female citizens" that overrides freedom of association.236
There are two exceptions to freedom of association that protect the right to
discriminate. One is what the Court might call intimate association. 23 My mental
model of an intimate association is a small dinner party; somebody not invited sues.
Freedom of association protects the right to exclude the non-invitee. The'other
exception exists where discrimination is integral to the express activity of the
group.238 My mental model here has been that the Ku Klux Klan can exclude African
Americans, as can the Nazi party, because discrimination is integral to the
expressive message of those groups.
The issue in Boy Scouts was whether discrimination against gays is integral to the
expressive message of the Boy Scouts. 239 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist accepted the Boy Scouts' argument.~' He pointed to some language in
Boy Scouts manuals saying Boy Scouts are supposed to be morally straight; they are
supposed to be clean of mind, and the like.2 4' But, most of all, he said the Boy
Scouts should be able to define their own expressiveness. 242 Being anti-gay should
be okay if they define it that way. That is the significance of the case.
Justice Stevens wrote a long dissent. 43 He discussed the Boy Scouts' materials
in detail, finding that there was nothing in them that indicated that Boy Scouts have
as a key expressive message to be anti-gay.2 " The concern, he said, is that if any
group can define its expressive message for itself, and can do so in litigation, then
why can't any group that wants to discriminate say, "It's our expressive
message"? 245 Why can't the Jaycees say, "Our expressive message is discriminating
against women," and be able to discriminate in that way? The key difference
between the majority and the dissent is the question of how to decide what the
expressive message of the group is. Does the group define itself by litigation?
B. Religion
I want to quickly discuss two religion cases, both quite important. The first is
Santa Fe Independent School Districtv. Doe.24 It involved the constitutionality of
prayers at football games. 47
I think your ability to understand this case depends on where in the country you
live. I grew up on the south side of Chicago, and I've lived in Los Angeles. It's hard

236. Id. at 623.
237. See id. at 617 (referring to "intimate human relationships").
238. See id. at 622 (noting the importance of "shielding dissident expression from suppression by the
majority").
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for me to understand the cultural significance of high school football games in
certain parts of the country. This case comes out of southern Texas."
The case has a long procedural history. For much of the procedural history, the
students at Santa Fe High School would hold an election every year to elect a
student to deliver an inspirational message before each varsity football game. 9 The
content of the message, it turns out, regularly involved delivering a prayer. It was
supposed to be a nonsectarian prayer, but in reality it was quite expressly a Christian
prayer. The question was, Is this constitutional? The Supreme Court, in a six-tothree decision, declared that the pre-game prayer violated the Establishment
Clause 0°
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court. 25' He emphasized that the
government, by allowing this student-led prayer, was creating the forum for the
activity.2 2 The government was participating in bringing the prayer to the event
through the election of the student and was involved in every way in the prayer
occurring. 253 Based on all of the school prayer cases, the Supreme Court said that
this was unconstitutional.2 4
I just want to point out some things that are significant about this case. In the last
five to ten years, conservatives have often tried to recapture and refocus traditional
issues as free speech, issues usually litigated under the Establishment Clause. In this
case, proponents of the student-led prayer argued that students should be able to say
whatever they want before football games; to prevent prayer would be to
discriminate against private religious speech, which the First Amendment
prohibits. 25'
I think it's quite significant that the Supreme Court rejected that argument. The
Court said that the football game was not a public forum; therefore students could
not say whatever they wanted." 6 The question left open by this ruling is, If there are
going to be subject matter restrictions, is it constitutional to exclude religious
-messages?
I think the other way the case is significant is that the Court makes no choice
between the competing theories in the Establishment Clause. The current Court, I
think, is quite divided on that. Should it be a straight separationist, pro-endorsement,
or coercion approach?
What I found interesting in Justice Stevens's opinion is that he used all of those
theories, and he said that they were all violated.7 He said the government was
bringing prayer into government programs and events. 58 That violated strict

248. See id. The text reads, "a small community in the southern part of the State." Id.
249. Id. at 294. Unless otherwise noted, all facts relating to this case are from Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530
U.S. at 294-98.
250. Id. at 301.
251. Doe, 530 U.S. at 294.
252. See id. at 302-03.
253. See id at 304-07.
254. Id. at 317.
255. See id. at 302 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)).
256. See Doe, 530 U.S. at 302-03.
257. See id. at 301-15.
258. See id. at 301-07.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

separation because it appeared to be government endorsement of religion. 9 There
is a lot of pressure on students to be in football games in these communities; that's
coercion, he said.2' The case is quite significant for these reasons, as is the six-tothree decision excluding prayer at football games.
The final case is a case that also came down on Wednesday, Mitchell v. Helms.261
The issue was the constitutionality of government aid to parochial schools;
specifically, Can the government give instructional equipment, like audio-visual
equipment or computers, to parochial schools? 262
In two cases in the 1970s, Wolman v. Walter263 and Meek v. Pittenger,2 " the
Supreme Court held that the government could not give instructional equipment to
parochial schools. 5 The Court said that the instructional equipment might be used
for religious instruction, and any government aid would be advancing religious
of computers and
instruction. 2' The Mitchell case involved the distribution
27
schools.
parochial
Louisiana
to
equipment
instructional
In a six-to-three decision without a majority opinion, the Supreme Court held that
the government may give instructional equipment to parochial schools. 26 The six
justices in the majority all agreed that Wolman v. Walter and Meek v. Pittingerare
overruled.269 That's about all the six justices in the majority agreed to.
In order to understand the justices' disagreement, I need to give a little bit of
background. In the mid 1980s, in a case called Aguilar v. Felton,270 the Supreme
Court held that public school remedial education teachers couldn't provide
instruction on parochial school premises because it would violate the Establishment
Clause. 27 '
In 1997, in Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court five to four overruled
Aguilar.272 Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion. 273 At the end she said, "To
summarize," we find violations of the Establishment Clause in three circumstances:
if the government is participating in religious indoctrination; if the government is
not neutral and it is favoring some religions over others; and, finally, if the
government is excessively entangled in the administration of programs. 274 It is
interesting that she labeled that as "summarizing," because it really was not the
summary at all. It was quite a different test than the Court had ever adopted.275
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In the case decided on Wednesday, Mitchell v. Helms, Justice Thomas wrote for
a plurality of the Court, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy." Thomas said
that the Agostini approach of Justice O'Connor is the test for the Establishment
Clause 2" and that the government should be able to give aid to religious schools so
long as it does not favor some religions over others.' Justice Thomas then said that
it is permissible for the government to give aid to parochial schools, even if that aid
is used for religious instruction. 279
Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring, joined by Justice Breyer.' She
said the Thomas approach is unprecedented in allowing parochial schools aid. 28 ' It
takes as the school test the government-neutral-among-religions standard. 282 That
has never been the approach of the Court. 3 O'Connor said that for her, the basic
rule is government aid can't be used for religious instruction.' Three justices
dissented. 2"
What about the next issue that is going to come up: school vouchers? We know
that four justices will clearly allow vouchers, even if the money goes to religious
instruction. 2 What about Justices O'Connor and Breyer? If the voucher money
goes for religious instruction, would it violate the test they announced on
Wednesday, or will they draw a distinction?
Even though I have gone over my allotted time, I have still only covered some of
the cases. There were so many of significance in this term, and already many
potential blockbusters are on the docket for next year (revival of the non-delegation
doctrine, drug testing for pregnant women, roadblocks, etc.). Law professors will
have plenty to write about for years to come, and if you're kind enough to invite me
back, I'll talk about those too.
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